FACTORS INFLUENCING HUMANITARIAN AID DELIVERY IN MOGADISHU, SOMALIA CASE STUDY SACID NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATION

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ABSTRACT

The general objective of the study was to investigate the factors influencing humanitarian aid delivery in Somalia. The specific objectives of the study were to examine the influence of human aid governance, human aid policy, human aid coordination and human aid funding on humanitarian aid delivery SACID in Mogadishu-Somalia. The study took a descriptive research design. According to (Kothari, 2014) descriptive studies are more formalized and typically structured with clearly stated hypotheses or investigate questions. This research employed qualitative data collection method whereby data gathered by the use of closed ended questionnaires which were self-administered. Factor analysis used to assess the validity and Cronbach alpha to assess reliability of the questionnaire. Multiple regression analysis conducted to determine the relationship between the factors influencing and humanitarian aid delivery. The sample of this study was SACID NGOs. The data collected from the selected sample of respondents. Results confirmed the varying importance of the factors influencing humanitarian aid delivery in Mogadishu. In general, the results revealed that human aid governance and human aid coordination had significant effects on humanitarian aid delivery, while human aid policy and human aid funding had significant effects on humanitarian aid delivery in SACID NGO Mogadishu-Somalia. The study recommended that the government improve humanitarian aid delivery Mogadishu, Somalia. Also the government should foster and develop human aid policy and human aid funding.

Key Findings: Humanitarian Aid, Delivery, Humanitarian Organizations, Human Aid, Governance, Human aid Policy, Human Aid, Coordination, Human Aid Funding
INTRODUCTION
Somalia is located in what is known as the Horn of Africa bounded to the east and southeast by the Indian Ocean, to the north and the northeast by the Gulf of Aden. Somalia has a coastline of 32,000 kilometers, extending from Loyade on the Gulf of Aden to Ras Kiyambone on the Indian Ocean. The land mass of the Republic is 626,541 square kilometers and Somalia is one of the world’s earliest populated lands dating back to the Paleolithic period, around 9000 BC (Ahmed, 2014). Humanitarian aid delivery is a material and logistic assistance to people in need. It is frequently short-term help until the long-term support by government and other organizations replaces it (Haysom, 2013). Humanitarian aid delivery is taking place in more complex environments than ever before. This is due to the fact that humanitarian aid agencies are increasingly delivering and operating in highly volatile and risky contexts these contexts have made the service delivery structure of humanitarian relief extremely complex. Various actors including UN agencies, governments, international and local nongovernmental organizations are involved in a single disaster response effort (Stephenson & Schnitzler, 2014). The principal interventions and activities of humanitarian aid agencies differ from those of development organizations in some important respects. The primary goals of humanitarian aid are to respond emergencies and disasters in order to protect life and to reduce excessive human suffering through immediate action or response (Shuria, 2015). The concept of humanitarian aid delivery was first presented in the early 1900s. by 2000 surveys indicated that the expansion of European power during the late early twentieth century’s, coupled with the arrival of Christian missionaries, is normally linked with the extent of Western thought and the introduction of such seminal ideas as enlightenment, civilization and sovereignty to the non-Western world. Notions of humanitarianism and humanism were also among those believed to have been transferred by the European imperial powers onto the ancient societies of East and Southeast Asia (Yeophantong, 2014). The Horn of Africa region, which includes Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, and Somalia, is facing its worst drought in 60 years. The situation is critical with more than 13.3 million people affected, 4 million in serious need of humanitarian aid, and 250,000 who are thought to be in dire need for food and at risk of starvation. Situations in Somalia have created an escalating refugee crisis, primarily in Kenya and Ethiopia. (Coordinator et al, 2014). In Somalia, 1992, high of the civil war Somalia established a benchmark for humanitarian crises in the immediate post-Cold War world. Somalia has suffered from conflict, scarcity and famine. There are more refugees from Somalia (at least 1 million) than from any other African country. Kenya and Ethiopia host the biggest Somali refugee population, at more than 500,000 and 200,000 people respectively. Another 1.5 million people are evacuated inside Somalia War and famine claimed the lives of a quarter of a million people. The combination of drought and conflict led humanitarian aid delivery in Somalia (Joel, 2013). After the fall down of the Somali regime of Siad Barre in 1991 a shift in the severity of the crisis began to take place. By mid-November, 1992 three famine areas were declared to be at pre-famine levels. Improvements are believed to have been due to the provision of support through a huge operation undertaken by the global community despite access constraints in Somalia. The effectiveness of the response relied on local and international partners that have had long-term widespread presence in the various areas in the region. Famine continues in three areas in Somalia Middle Shabelle and among the internally evacuated populations (IDPs) in Afgooye and Mogadishu while other areas remain extremely
fragile. The number of persons at risk of malnourishment has been reduced to 250,000 but an assessed 4 million Somalis remain in acute food and livelihood crisis countrywide. UNOCHA also reclassified the status of the famine crisis from catastrophe to emergency (Mark, 2013).

Before 1991, Somalia had a functioning government, humanitarian assistance was less in the country. After 1992, when the regime of Siad Barre distorted and its institutions were dismantled, clan-based factions fill the gap but unsuccessful to unite. They attacked each other and activated a war that caused the deaths of an approximated 250,000 people and drove hundreds of thousands out of the territory. Since 1991 the country had suffered between 450,000 and 1.5 million deaths related to fight and drought. Nearly a million people were driven out of the country as refugees and 1.5 million more were internally displaced in this period. Thousands of people continue to be displaced within Somalia or to look for refuge in neighboring countries: especially Kenya, where the Dadaab refugee camp has become the biggest in the world (Kemp, 2013).

SAACID is an indigenous Somali NGO dedicated to enhancing the life options of women, children and the poor within Somalia. Founded in 1990 SACID is the oldest and largest Somali organization of its kind, with an impressive record of managing large-scale complex emergency and development programme cycles. SACID works in seven sectors: Women’s Empowerment, Livelihoods and Development, Health, Nutrition, Water and Sanitation, Education, Security, Conflict Resolution and Governance, Security, Conflict Resolution and Governance, Emergency relief, and Research. SACID is results driven, and has consistently delivered high quality outputs through more than two decades of structural anarchy that has prevailed in Somalia, by employing bottom-up, community-based models, investing in multi-clan trust-based relationships, and applying innovations. SACID had a staff establishment employee. Given the changing political context and our desire to break away from a donor dependency model, we continue to seek entrepreneurial solutions to build long-term durable development solutions in Somalia, and we welcome the opportunity to discuss these with interested actors. The NGO of SACID is among the local NGOs that have opened relief coordinating offices in Internal displaces (IDps). The NGO SACID has carried out the following humanitarian responses and actions: drilling close to 20 new water-wells, the supply and administration of mobile clinics (health care) in Somalia, construction of an inpatient outpatient hospital, the construction of a primary and secondary school in Grasballey and providing occasional distributions of non-food-items (NFI) and dry and nutritious foods to the IDPs in the Elasha Biyaha camps (SACID, 2015).

Ideally humanitarian assistance operates within an extremely political context is not a recent phenomenon. Traditionally, agencies have adopted a series of strategies to resist the undermining of the effectiveness of their actions by competing political agendas of both warring parties and international donor governments. Before 1991, Somalia had functioning government, a humanitarian assistance were less in the country. After 1992, when the regime of Siad Barre collapsed and its institutions were dismantled, clan-based factions fill the gap but unsuccessful to unite. They attacked each other and provoked a war that caused the deaths of an approximated 250,000 people and drove hundreds of thousands out of the territory. Since 1991 the country has suffered between 450,000 and 1.5 million deaths related to conflict and drought. Nearly a million people have been driven out of the country as refugees and 1.5 million more have been internally displaced in this period. Thousands of people continue to be
displaced within Somalia or to seek refuge in neighboring countries: especially Kenya, where the Dadaab refugee camp has become the biggest in the world (ECHO, 2014).

RESEARCH HYPOTHESES

- $H_01$: Human aid governance does not have a statistically significant influence on Humanitarian aid delivery in Mogadishu, Somalia.
- $H_02$: Human aid policy does not have a statistically significant influence on Humanitarian aid delivery in Mogadishu, Somalia.
- $H_03$: Human aid co-ordination does not have a statistically significant influence on Humanitarian aid delivery in Mogadishu, Somalia.
- $H_04$: Human aid funding does not have a statistically significant influence on Humanitarian aid delivery in Mogadishu, Somalia.

RELATED LITERATURE

Theoretical Framework

Modernization Theory

According to this theory, through the 1920s, humanitarian aid activities seem to be merely an incidental element of American civil life. The only clear record of aid during this time was through the church and its missionaries. Although often driven by religious sentiment and friendly toward the work of the church, the American government did not seem to consider it responsible for offering humanitarian aid. By the 1920s, the American government offered some forms of aid, but there were niches that they did not, could not, or chose not to manage. Organized charities filled some of these niches, but they were not yet recognized by the government as official entities. A big change in the American perspective came in the 1930s as the Great Depression and the New Deal created a more visible need for nongovernmental humanitarian aid. The major changes in people’s lives during these years opened wide. The door for organized charity to become more visible and better represented in the American story. Found that since the 1930s there has been extensive development of a distinct nonprofit sector focused on delivery of humanitarian aid. These organizations did the kind of research and development that could lead to a more effective and efficient government role. They also carried out programs that helped to relieve part of the American government’s burden in administering humanitarian aid (Christina, 2013).

Dependency Theory

Dependency Theory became a popular perspective in the 1960s and 1970s as a reaction to Modernization Theory. Dependency theorists believe the cause of underdevelopment in poor countries is due to the exploitation of the poor by the rich. Because of this belief, humanitarian aid strategies must seek to alleviate this exploitation and allow the poor to move into an equal level of development (Christina, 2013).

Theory of Active Acceptance Based Approach

Organizations can seek acceptance-based security for their staff and activities in a variety of ways along a spectrum that ranges from a default style of passive acceptance (i.e., eschewing any association with political or military actors or other international entities), to an active acceptance posture involving proactive outreach strategies, to direct humanitarian negotiation for access and secure for the reason that humanitarian negotiation requires greater skills and capacities than are currently found among many agencies operating in the field. An important finding of the research was that generally the more active diligent, the organization was in its acceptance efforts, and the
greater its capacity to communicate and negotiate with all parties, the better access and security it was able to obtain. Of course where dominant restrictions to access exist, such as host-state imposed limitations or active continuing conflict, access was still being far from optimal (OCED, 2015).

Principal-Agent theory

According to (Third Pan-European Conference on EU Politics, 2013) first introduced the Principal-Agent imagery, describes how a Principle-Agent relationship is created “between two (or more) parties when one, designated as the agent, acts for, on behalf of, or as the representative for the other, designated the principal, in a particular domain of decision problems”. European Union member state governments are modeled as the collective principal delegating to an agent, the European Commission, the responsibility for Carrying out a set of tasks on their behalf in the domain of humanitarian aid provision. Principle-Agent analysis, while initially developed to study delegation of power to non-majoritarian institutions in the United States, has been increasingly applied in European Union studies to explore the interaction between European Union supranational institutions and European Union member governments, Principle-Agent analysis has mostly focused on internal European Union policy domains (Thomas, 2013).

Factors influencing humanitarian aid delivery

The following section presents a review on variables namely human aid governance, human aid policy, human aid coordination and human aid funding that influences humanitarian aid delivery.

Human aid Governance

Government institution of human aid governance is accountable, participatory, responsive, equitable and inclusive. It assures that corruption is minimized, the views of minorities are taken into account and that the voices of the most vulnerable in society are heard in consensus oriented decision-
making. It is also responsive to the present and future needs of society. Accountability is a key requirement of good governance and constitutes the other side of participation (Amos, 2013). Accountability can take many forms, including accurate reporting of financial data, the publication of annual reports, and the responsible use of resources. Who is accountable to whom varies depending on whether decisions or actions taken are internal or external to an organization or institution. In general, an organization or an institution is accountable to those who will be affected by its decisions or actions. Accountability cannot be enforced without transparency and the rule of law. Government institutions, the private sector and civil society organizations must be accountable to the public and to their institutional stakeholders about what they have done, will do or failed to do.

The central functions of government are those which make policy, plan, and oversee service delivery to citizens. These vary across countries, but comprise the organizations and structures within the central branch of government which manage and co-ordinate policies and strategies. Reforms to the central functions of government are thus typically aimed at changing the capacity of national government to make policy, to plan, and to maintain strategic oversight of service delivery. Support to these sorts of reforms has absorbed significant aid volumes over the past decade. Efforts have largely focused on improving the policymaking capacity of the Executive, as well as enhancing the central oversight and management of strategic programs. Reforming these functions, and strengthening their capacity, is critical building blocks for an effective, accountable and responsive public sector (Mc Ewen, 2015).

Human aid Policy

The goal of human aid policy is to help to save lives, alleviate suffering and maintain human dignity for the benefit of people in need who are, or are at risk of becoming, affected by armed conflicts, natural disasters or other disaster situations. The basic principle is that the Government and its agencies should, in accordance with international law and established practice in international humanitarian aid operations, be prepared to offer assistance in cases where the central government or society as a whole in a disaster-stricken country is unable or unwilling to meet the humanitarian needs that arise. The point of departure for the human aid policy is that every state has primary responsibility for meeting humanitarian needs that arise within its borders. In the event that the central government or other institutions of a country are unwilling or unable to meet this responsibility, the government’s view is that external organizations and states that have the necessary capacity have a duty, in accordance with international law and established practice in international humanitarian aid operations, to provide support for action to meet these needs, if possible with the consent of the state in which the needs exist. This duty is often called the humanitarian imperative (Harpsund, 2014).

Government system the goal of the government’s policy is to help to save lives, alleviate suffering and maintain human dignity for the benefit of people in need who are, or are at risk of becoming, affected by armed conflicts, natural disasters or other disaster situations. The humanitarian aid policy is intended to contribute to achieving the goal of the government’s international development cooperation, i.e. to help to create the necessary conditions for poor people to improve their living conditions, and thus to achieving the overall goal of the government’s development policy, i.e. equitable and sustainable global. Development, as declared in
the Bill, Shared Responsibility: Sweden’s Global Development Policy, which has been passed by Parliament (Harpsund, 2014).

**Human Aid Coordination**

When discussing UN coordination, state that Coordination is the systematic use of policy instruments to deliver humanitarian assistance in a cohesive and effective manner. Such instruments include strategic planning, gathering data and managing information, mobilizing resources and ensuring accountability, orchestrating a functional division of labor, negotiating and maintaining a serviceable framework with host political authorities and providing leadership. Walden, *et al.* (2014), indicated that major organizations including Oxfam and United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) have adopted four benchmarks used in responding to humanitarian emergencies in delivering aid. These include: the speed and timelines of the response in delivery of humanitarian aid, coordination of aid and finally the appropriateness of relief (aid) provided by the humanitarian aid delivery organizations. These three measures have been used to measure humanitarian aid delivery effectiveness in this study as discussed in the subsequent sections. Coordination of Humanitarian Aid Studies on humanitarian aid delivery has indicated that complex humanitarian crises provide challenging setting for coordination. Coordination of disaster assistance is critical for effective humanitarian aid operations. However, the coordination of relief in international humanitarian crises has long been viewed as troubled with problems of inadequate interagency coordination further, factors that are both internal and external to aid delivery bring more complexities and challenges to attain successful coordination. Stephenson argued that humanitarian operations require successful response through effective deployment and coordination of resources under dynamic decisions (Amos, 2013).

A research noted that the progress of the flow of resources among agencies and increases in the accountability, effectiveness and impact of aid operations critically depend on the improvement of the level of coordination among humanitarian aid organizations. The coordination of aid delivery is demanding as it involves requirements typical of an emergency situation that includes, for example, high uncertainty and 35 necessities for rapid decision making and response under resource constraint. The nature and extent of humanitarian operations is relevant to strategic coordination. Most of the aid organizations involved in relief delivery indicated that the top-down strategic coordination of humanitarian organization within organisations is discouraging. This is further aggravated by competing missions, differing organizational strategies, policies, and norms among organizations. In fact, research by Leutze, Jones and Duffield (2014), indicated that coordination of humanitarian aid among local, national, regional and international interests of warring parties, neighboring countries and donor governments is paramount for access to affected populations. NGOs are widely recognized as key actors in an effective, efficient and accountable emergency response because they are frontline implementers for the majority of humanitarian operations. As such, the appropriate engagement of NGOs within humanitarian leadership is a critical component for success. Each year humanitarian relief organizations respond to as few as 20 and as many as 50 crises caused by natural disasters or political conflict. The number of agencies responding to each crisis varies greatly depending on the need. Regardless of whether the number of agencies is 40 or 400, the need for humanitarian relief organizations to coordinate their efforts is crucial. Benefits of coordination range from
reducing activity duplication to allowing organizations to assist more people in need not to mention that donors increasingly require it That coordination is important is generally accepted and appreciated in the humanitarian aid field but how to accomplish it remains somewhat more elusive and problematic (Nicole, 2014).

Differences in geographical, cultural and organizational policies may create additional barriers Even when organizations intend to coordinate; communication challenges may hinder coordination. For instance, coordination between local and foreign organizations may be impeded by language; coordination meetings held in English inadvertently exclude those NGOs without English-speaking staff. An important characteristic of the relief environment is that it is unregulated; there is usually no single organization with the authority to cause other actors to engage in a particular coordination activity. Typically, the governments of the affected countries are responsible for the conduct of disaster relief operations in their countries, and other actors are obliged to abide by the laws of the country in which they are operating. Unfortunately, governments may lack the necessary experience and knowledge required to manage emergencies effectively, especially when the effects of disasters are overwhelming. In situations in which the government is either non-functional or dysfunctional, the roles of relief actors are often unclear (Balcik, 2013).

Coordination mechanism in the relief community Organizations in the international relief community differ in terms of their mandates, sizes, and expertise. Historically, these organizations have operated separate relief chains responding to global crises, managing their logistics activities (transportation, procurement, warehousing) independently. We now review the coordination efforts: (i) among international relief actors and (ii) among international relief actors and local organizations (local NGOs, the general public, governments, military). (i) Among international relief actors: Most relief chain coordination mechanisms involving international relief actors are horizontal, in that they concern resource sharing and joint decision-making. Most coordination mechanisms also involve a single lead agency (a coordinating body, inter-agency committee, or an umbrella organization) that creates and/or facilitates an environment for horizontal coordination. Since pre-planning (e.g., pre-positioning relief supply inventory) can be expensive, and there are many logistical challenges in disaster relief, relief organizations can often benefit significantly from the support provided by umbrella organizations. In this case, while relief organizations’ autonomy and independence are preserved, the support of the umbrella organization provides a strong incentive for organizations to voluntarily coordinate (Clajot, 2015).

The coordination needs of various stakeholders: what they need to share in coordination forums, the information they need to know, in order to make what individual and collective decisions, etc. Coordination is accepted as good practice within the humanitarian community, however individual and regular participation of organizations are dependent on people’s willingness and motivation. Therefore it is important to understand the driving forces of participation. Understanding these coordination needs and expectations is a fundamental starting point - a yardstick against which we can measure the effectiveness of any cash coordination mechanisms. The stakeholders considered here are: NGOs (international and national), UN Agencies, donors, the private sector, host governments and local authorities. What emerged very clearly throughout the course of this review is that different stakeholders have different coordination needs (Kauffmann & Collins, 2014).
Human Aid Funding

NGOs are expressing difficulty in finding sufficient, appropriate and continuous funding for their work. They find accessing donors as challenging as dealing with their funding conditions. They perceive there to be certain cartels of individuals and NGOs that control access to donor funds. They have limited resource mobilization skills and are often not looking for funds that are available locally, preferring to wait for international donors to approach them. There is a high dependency of donors and a tendency to shift interventions to match donor priorities. There is a lack of financial, project and organizational sustainability. Funding and donors. Another way to categories humanitarian organizations is by their sources of funding; the typical distinction is made between private and public. Private funding, from individuals, corporations, or religious societies, are usually less conditional- and therefore leave organization more independent. Public funding, that is funding from states, can be given on conditions of specific usage, or for specific programs and projects. However, the distinction is not categorical, as most large humanitarian Organizations rely on a combination of private and public funding. There is also a large diversity in how states act as donors. ECHO, for instance, has a rigorous reporting and accountability policies -even taking the step of conducting their own field monitoring of the humanitarian activities they finance. For gulf-state donors, the Islamic concept of zakat, or charity, hinders active accountability practices because the size and content of donations are to be kept private in accordance with the Qur’an (Ulstein, 2014).

Financial flexibility one of the biggest challenges of the humanitarian organizations’ CEOs is how to source funding that is unrestricted and or is extremely flexible and can be used both for a quick response to new emergencies and to fill short-term funding gaps (Fawcett & Fawcett, 2013). The race for donor funds has also created competition among organizations that want to be the first to get funds for humanitarian aid response. Due to competition in humanitarian aid funding, humanitarian organization created inflexible systems with conditions that put direct control of funders over implementers, thus creating perfect inflexibility. Another essential condition for humanitarian response to be effective is the availability of sufficient financial resources. According to Nickerson (2013), humanitarian aid organizations coordinate billions of dollars in relief responses annually to victims of natural disasters, civil conflicts and wars. Their chief task is the timely mobilization of financing and goods from international donors and administering relief to the vulnerable beneficiaries at disaster sites across the globe. However, there are challenges of financial flexibility for the majority of organizations when responding to emergencies Most of the humanitarian organizations lack core funding and work on a short term project basis. In regards to this, donors’ decisions and preferences are critical in terms of overall staffing and operational capacity. Therefore, as humanitarian agencies seek to expand their presence and operations, they are inevitably influenced by the actions of the 58 donors which are sometimes donor-led political projects that are not flexible enough to respond to humanitarian emergencies. Every humanitarian organization needs to have sufficient cash flow from various income sources so as to pay out expenses and other obligations when they are due. Some organizations create reserves by setting aside cash in addition to the regular bank fund balances for use when regular cash flow is disrupted. The funding mechanism has been blamed for many of the
inefficiencies in humanitarian operations as they can directly and indirectly affect the effectiveness and efficiency of disaster response as well as the flexibilities of the humanitarian organizations (Sheppard, et al., 2013).

**Human Aid Delivery**

Humanitarian aid agencies deliver emergency supplies and services to people affected by disasters. Scholars and practitioners have developed modeling approaches to support aid delivery planning, but they have used objective functions with little validation as to the trade-offs among the multiple goals of aid delivery. We develop a method to value the performance of aid delivery plans based on expert preferences over five key attributes: the amount of cargo delivered, the prioritization of aid by commodity type, the prioritization of aid by delivery location, the speed of delivery, and the operational cost. Through a conjoint analysis survey, we measure the preferences of 18 experienced humanitarian logisticians. The survey results quantify the importance of each attribute and enable the development of a piecewise linear utility function that can be used as an objective function in optimization models. The results show that the amount of cargo delivered is the most valued objective and cost the least important. In addition, experts prioritize more vulnerable communities and more critical commodities, but not to the exclusion of others. With these insights and the experts’ utility functions, better humanitarian objective functions can be developed to enable better aid delivery in emergency response (Wagenaar, 2013).

**METHODOLOGY**

The study took a descriptive research design. According to (Kothari, 2014) descriptive studies are more formalized and typically structured with clearly stated hypotheses or investigate questions. The multiple regression model is specified as:

\[ Y = \beta_0 + \beta_1 X_1 + \beta_2 X_2 + \beta_3 X_3 + \beta_4 X_4 + \epsilon \]

Where:

- \( Y \) = Represents the dependent variable, humanitarian aid delivery.
- \( \beta_0 \) = Intercept of regression line
- \( \beta_1 \) - \( \beta_4 \) = Partial regression coefficient of the Independent Variables.
- \( X_1 \): is the human aid governance
- \( X_2 \): is the human aid policy
- \( X_3 \): is the human aid coordination
- \( X_4 \): is the human aid funding
- \( \epsilon \) = error term or stochastic term.

**RESEARCH FINDINGS**

**Humanitarian aid Governance:** Table 1: Human aid governance

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Statement</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>S.D</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The sovereignty state intervened Humanitarian aid delivery</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>3.15</td>
<td>1.605</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The government policy is Relation to humanitarian delivery</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>2.74</td>
<td>1.127</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government policy participate Humanitarian aid delivery</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>4.16</td>
<td>1.034</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>If poorly managed government may Postpone aid delivery</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>3.78</td>
<td>1.129</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government policy affect humanitarian Aid delivery</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>3.65</td>
<td>1.129</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The first objective of the study was to examine the influence of human aid governance on humanitarian aid delivery SACID in Somalia. Respondents were required to respond to set questions related to human aid governance and give their opinions. The statement that the sovereignty state intervened humanitarian aid delivery had a mean score of 3.15 and standard deviation of 1.605. The statement that the government policy is relation to humanitarian aid delivery had a mean score of 2.74 and standard deviation of 1.127. The statement that the government policy participate humanitarian aid delivery had a mean score of 4.16 and a standard deviation of 1.034. The statement that if poorly managed government may postpone aid delivery had a mean score of 3.78 and a standard deviation of 1.129. The statement that Government policy affects humanitarian delivery had a mean score of 3.65 and a standard deviation of 1.129.

**Humanitarian aid policy**

**Table 2: Humanitarian aid policy**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Statement</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>S.D</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Humanitarian aid policy is affected to Humanitarian aid delivery.</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>3.38</td>
<td>.893</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>If aid reaches its intended groups it can still be confiscated Armed groups.</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>4.10</td>
<td>.968</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>If the humanitarian aid policy country is good it alleviates The armed groups.</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>4.00</td>
<td>.715</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armed force that intervene humanitarian aid delivery had Poor active for NGO.</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>3.81</td>
<td>.595</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International NGO pass humanitarian aid but lack of delivery for right Time, place and right people.</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>3.74</td>
<td>.822</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The second objective of the study was to determine the influence of human aid policy on humanitarian aid delivery in Somalia. Respondents were required to respond to set questions related to human aid policy and give their opinions. The statement that the Humanitarian aid policy is affected to humanitarian aid delivery had a mean score of 3.38 and standard deviation of 0.893. The statement that the If aid reaches its intended groups it can still be confiscated armed groups had a mean score of 4.10 and standard deviation of 0.968. The statement that If the humanitarian aid policy country is good it alleviates the armed groups had a mean score of 4.00 and a standard deviation of 0.715. The statement that there is armed force that intervene humanitarian aid delivery and become poor active NGO had a mean score of 3.81 and a standard deviation of 0.595. The statement that International NGO pass humanitarian aid but instability cause did not deliver for right time, place and right people had a mean score of 3.74 and a standard deviation of 0.822.

**Human aid Coordination**

**Table 3: Human aid coordination**
International NGOs pass the work through local Somali NGOs to implement their programs.
Better relationships, among human aid Coordination and human aid delivery.
A successful system is human aid coordination Between the donors and the affected region.
There is always joint coordination of aid delivery between my organization and other agencies.
My organization always collaborates with other Agencies in Somalia.
My organization frequently share information with other humanitarian agencies in Somalia.

The third objective of the study was to find out the influence of human aid coordination on humanitarian aid delivery in Somalia. Respondents were required to respond to set questions related to human aid coordination and give their opinions. The statement that the International NGOs pass the work through local Somali NGOs to implement their programs had a mean score of 3.87 and standard deviation of 0.947. The statement that the Better relationships, among humanitarian Coordination and humanitarian aid delivery had a mean score of 3.06 and standard deviation of 0.953. The statement that A successful system is humanitarian aid coordination Between the donors and the affected region had a mean score of 4.20 and a standard deviation of 0.760. The statement that there is always joint coordination of aid delivery between my organization and other agencies had a mean score of 4.22 and a standard deviation of 0.750. The statement that My organization always collaborates with other agencies in Somalia had a mean score of 3.59 and a standard deviation of 0.997. The statement that My organization frequently share information with other humanitarian agencies in Somalia had a mean score of 4.36 and a standard deviation of 0.833.

Human aid funding

Table 4: Human aid funding

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Statement</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>S.D</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>My organization able to create Un-restricted funding For the organization.</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>3.65</td>
<td>.789</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>My organization able to source for sufficient funding On time as to deliver the humanitarian recipients.</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>3.62</td>
<td>.896</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>My organization able to maintain general reserves For the organization in delivering the aid.</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>4.10</td>
<td>.693</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>My organization able to mobilize funding quickly To the human being.</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>3.90</td>
<td>1.091</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
My organization able to re-allocate funds quickly from current programs to new humanitarian emergencies. 85 3.72 1.337
My organization able to re-allocate organizational priorities of funding 85 4.25 .792

The fourth objective of the study was to establish the influence of human aid funding on humanitarian aid delivery in Somalia. Respondents were required to respond to set questions related to human aid funding and give their opinions. The statement that my organization able to create Un-restricted funding for the organization had a mean score of 3.65 and standard deviation of 0.789. The statement that my organization able to source for sufficient funding. On time as to deliver the humanitarian recipients had a mean score of 3.62 and standard deviation of 0.896. The statement that my organization able to maintain general reserves for the organization in delivering the aid had a mean score of 4.10 and a standard deviation of 0.693. The statement that my organization able to mobilize funding quickly to the human being had a mean score of 3.90 and a standard deviation of 1.091. The statement that my organization able to re-allocate funds quickly from current programs to new humanitarian emergencies delivery had a mean score of 3.72 and a standard deviation of 1.337. The statement that My organization able to re-allocate organizational priorities of funding had a mean score of 4.25 and a standard deviation of 0.792.

Humanitarian aid delivery

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Statement</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>S.D</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>My organization identifies humanitarian Emergencies and disasters very quickly.</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>4.29</td>
<td>.636</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>My organization carries out assessment Very quickly for appropriate response.</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>3.52</td>
<td>1.167</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>My organization delivers humanitarian and For response very urgently relief items.</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>4.07</td>
<td>1.113</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>My organization identifies the disaster and Emergencies on time.</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>4.27</td>
<td>.444</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The statement that my organization identifies humanitarian emergencies and disasters very quickly had a mean score of 4.29 and a standard deviation of 0.636. The statement that My organization carries out assessment very quickly for appropriate response had a mean score of 3.52 and standard deviation of 1.167. The statement that my organization delivers humanitarian and for response very urgently relief items had a mean score 4.07 and a standard deviation of 1.113. The statement that my organization identifies the disaster and emergencies on time had a mean score of 4.27 and a standard deviation 0.444.

Correlation Analysis

Pearson correlation analysis was conducted to assess factors influencing humanitarian aid delivery in Mogadishu, Somalia. There was a statistically
significant influence of human aid governance on humanitarian aid delivery in Mogadishu, Somalia ($r = 0.483; \ p \leq 0.05$), human aid policy on humanitarian aid delivery in Mogadishu, Somalia ($r = 0.499; \ p \leq 0.05$), human aid co-ordination on humanitarian aid delivery in Mogadishu, Somalia ($r = 0.465; \ p \leq 0.05$), and human aid funding on humanitarian aid delivery in Mogadishu, Somalia ($r = 0.559; \ p \leq 0.05$). Table 6 presents the results of the Pearson correlation analysis was conducted to assess factors influencing humanitarian aid delivery in Mogadishu, Somalia.

**Table 6: Pearson Correlation Analysis**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Human Aid Governance ($X_1$)</th>
<th>Human Aid Policy ($X_2$)</th>
<th>Human Aid Co-ordination ($X_3$)</th>
<th>Human Aid Funding ($X_4$)</th>
<th>Human Aid Delivery ($Y$)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Human Aid Governance ($X_1$)</td>
<td>Pearson Correlation</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sig. (2-tailed)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>85</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Human Aid Policy ($X_2$)</td>
<td>Pearson Correlation</td>
<td>.126</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sig. (2-tailed)</td>
<td></td>
<td>.249</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>85</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Human Aid Co-ordination ($X_3$)</td>
<td>Pearson Correlation</td>
<td>-.053</td>
<td>.244*</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sig. (2-tailed)</td>
<td></td>
<td>.632</td>
<td>.024</td>
<td>85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>85</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Human Aid Funding ($X_4$)</td>
<td>Pearson Correlation</td>
<td>-.123</td>
<td>-.203</td>
<td>.052</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sig. (2-tailed)</td>
<td></td>
<td>.262</td>
<td>.063</td>
<td>.635</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Human Aid Delivery ($Y$)</td>
<td>Pearson Correlation</td>
<td>.483**</td>
<td>.499**</td>
<td>.465**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sig. (2-tailed)</td>
<td></td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>85</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

**Regression Analysis**

Multiple regression analysis was conducted to assess factors influencing humanitarian aid delivery in Mogadishu, Somalia.

**Model Summary**

The model explains 89.6% of the variance (R Square = 0.896) on humanitarian aid delivery. Clearly, there are factors other than the four proposed in this model which can be used to predict organizational performance. However, this is still a dependable model in consideration to Cooper and Schinder’s (2013) opinion that as much as lower value R square of 0.10-0.20 is acceptable in social science research. The implication here is that 89.6% of the relationship is explained by the identified model independent variables whereas the rest 10.4% is explained by other factors in the organizational performance not studied in this research. Table 7
presents the model summary.

**Table 7: Model Summary**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Model</th>
<th>R Square</th>
<th>Adjusted R Square</th>
<th>Std. Error of the Estimate</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>.949a</td>
<td>.901</td>
<td>.04080</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

a. Predictors: (Constant), Human Aid Funding, Human Aid Co-ordination, Human Aid Governance, Human Aid Policy

**Analysis of Variance (ANOVA)**

The study used ANOVA to establish the significance of the regression model. In testing the significance level, the statistical significance was considered significant if the p-value was less or equal to 0.05. The significance of the regression model is as per Table 8 below with P-value of 0.00 which is less than 0.05. This indicates that the regression model is statistically significant in predicting factors of organizational performance. Basing the confidence level at 95% the analysis indicates high reliability of the results obtained. The overall Anova results indicates that the model was significant at F = 6.592, p = 0.000. Table 8 presents the ANOVA.

**Table 8: ANOVA**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Model</th>
<th>Sum Squares</th>
<th>df</th>
<th>Mean Square</th>
<th>F</th>
<th>Sig.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 Regression</td>
<td>1.206</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>.302</td>
<td>181.141</td>
<td>.000a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Residual</td>
<td>.133</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>.002</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>1.340</td>
<td>84</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

a. Predictors: (Constant), Human Aid Funding, Human Aid Co-ordination, Human Aid Governance, Human Aid Policy
b. Dependent Variable: Human Aid Delivery1

**Multiple Regression Analysis Coefficients**

The regression equation above has established that taking all factors into account (Humanitarian aid delivery as a result of human aid governance, human aid policy, human aid coordination and human aid funding) constant at zero Humanitarian aid delivery was 0.304. The findings presented also shows that taking all other independent variables at zero, a unit increase in human aid governance will lead to a 0.248 increase in the scores of Humanitarian aid delivery; a unit increase in Human aid Policy will lead to a 0.160 increase in Humanitarian aid delivery; a unit increase in Human aid Coordination will lead to a 0.180 increase in the scores of Humanitarian aid delivery; a unit increase in Human aid Funding will lead to a 0.186 increase in the score of Humanitarian aid delivery. This therefore implies that all the four variables have a positive relationship with human aid governance contributing most to the dependent variable. From the table we can see that the predictor variables of human aid governance, human aid policy, human aid coordination and human aid funding got variable coefficients statistically
significant since their p-values are less than the common alpha level of 0.05.
The multiple regression model:
\[ Y = \beta_0 + \beta_1 X_1 + \beta_2 X_2 + \beta_3 X_3 + \beta_4 X_4 + \epsilon \]
Becomes:
\[ Y = 0.304 + 0.248X_1 + 0.160X_2 + 0.180X_3 + 0.186X_4 \]

Where;

Table: 9: Coefficients

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Model</th>
<th>Unstandardized Coefficients</th>
<th>Standardized Coefficients</th>
<th>t</th>
<th>Sig.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>B</td>
<td>Std. Error</td>
<td>Beta</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. (Constant)</td>
<td>.304</td>
<td>.072</td>
<td>4.202</td>
<td>.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Human aid Gov.</td>
<td>.248</td>
<td>.017</td>
<td>.514</td>
<td>14.339</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Human aid policy</td>
<td>.160</td>
<td>.013</td>
<td>.467</td>
<td>12.442</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Human aid Coordination</td>
<td>.180</td>
<td>.019</td>
<td>.348</td>
<td>9.478</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Human aid Funding</td>
<td>.186</td>
<td>.012</td>
<td>.582</td>
<td>16.009</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

a. Dependent Variable: Human Aid Delivery

Hypotheses Testing

Hypothesis 1
The first research hypothesis \( H_01: \) Human aid governance has no statistically influence on human aid delivery in Mogadishu, Somalia. \((\beta = 0.514; t = 14.339; p < 0.05)\) was rejected and conclusion made that there was a statistically significant influence of human aid governance on Human aid delivery in Mogadishu, Somalia. The result was consistent with Abdirahman (2015).

Hypothesis 2
The second research hypothesis \( H_02: \) Human aid policy has no statistically influence on human aid delivery in Mogadishu, Somalia. \((\beta = 0.467; t = 12.442; p < 0.05)\) was rejected and conclusion made that there was a statistically significant influence of human aid policy on Human aid delivery in Mogadishu, Somalia. The result was consistent with Muchuri (2012).

Hypothesis 3
The third research hypothesis \( H_03: \) Human aid co-ordination has no statistically influence on human aid delivery in Mogadishu, Somalia. \((\beta = 0.348; t = 9.478; p < 0.05)\) was rejected and conclusion made that there was a statistically significant influence of human aid co-ordination on Human aid delivery in Mogadishu, Somalia. The result was consistent with James (2013).
Hypothesis 4
The fourth research hypothesis, H₄: Human aid funding has no statistically influence on human aid delivery in Mogadishu, Somalia. (β = 0.582; t = 16.009; p < 0.05) was rejected and conclusion made that there was a statistically significant influence of human aid funding on Human aid delivery in Mogadishu, Somalia. The result was consistent with Hassan (2010). Table 9 presents the results of the hypotheses testing.

Table 9: Hypotheses Testing

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Hypotheses</th>
<th>B</th>
<th>T</th>
<th>Sig.</th>
<th>Comments</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>H₀₁: Human aid governance has no statistically influence on human aid delivery in Mogadishu, Somalia.</td>
<td>.514</td>
<td>14.339</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>Reject H₀₁</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H₀₂: Human aid policy has no statistically influence on human aid delivery in Mogadishu, Somalia.</td>
<td>.467</td>
<td>12.442</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>Reject H₀₂</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H₀₃: Human aid co-ordination has no statistically influence on human aid delivery in Mogadishu, Somalia.</td>
<td>.348</td>
<td>9.478</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>Reject H₀₃</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H₀₄: Human aid funding has no statistically influence on human aid delivery in Mogadishu, Somalia.</td>
<td>.582</td>
<td>16.009</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>Reject H₀₄</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

CONCLUSION

Conclusions
The study concluded the following:

Influence of Human aid Governance on Humanitarian aid delivery
The study results showed that there was a statistically significant influence of human aid funding on humanitarian aid delivery in Mogadishu, Somalia.

Influence of Human aid Policy on Humanitarian aid delivery
The study results showed that there was a statistically significant influence of human aid funding on humanitarian aid delivery in Mogadishu, Somalia.

Influence of Human aid funding on Humanitarian aid delivery
The study results showed that there was a statistically significant influence of human aid funding on humanitarian aid delivery in Mogadishu, Somalia.

RECOMMENDATION
The study recommended as follows: That Somali government should study and select the driver that best suits their organizations in order to achieve maximum delivery.
The Somali government should encourage NGO’S to ensure that the NGOs have put in place governance and policies to be adhered during aid delivery. The Somali government is also urged to ensure that there are always joint coordination of aid delivery between my organization and other agencies. The Somali government should increase their operating sustainable funding; through increasing of their fund payment period in order to positively influence their humanitarian aid delivery.

**Areas for Further Research**

The study sought to establish the effect of factors of human aid on the delivery of humanitarian aid for SACID NGO in Mogadishu - Somalia, the study recommends a further study to be done on the factors of effecting human aid on humanitarian aid delivery of other NGO’S. A similar study can be done on other working donors of Non-governmental Organizations and see whether the findings hold true. Future studies should apply different research instruments like secondary data, focus group discussions to involve respondents in discussions in order to generate detailed information which would help improve factors of human aid delivery in NGO’s in Mogadishu- Somalia.

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