THE DYNAMICS OF CORRUPTION IN THE PUBLIC SECTOR: CASE OF KENYA PUBLIC SERVICE
Abstract
Unless it is understood that bureaucratic corruption is opportunistic behavior and is related to the scope and extent of government regulation of economic activities, cleanup programs are unlikely to succeed. This article examined bureaucratic corruption and cleanup strategies in developing countries. It particularly examined Kenya Public Sector corruption and advanced initiatives like the public-choice approach as the most effective and intellectually sastifying framework for corruption cleanup. The rules that regulate socio-political relations in a country have a significant impact on the ability of civil servants to seek and secure, either legally or illegally, outside income. In non-democratic societies, bureaucrats are less constrained in their employment of public resources to lobby legislators and influence those individuals with direct responsibility for determining levels of compensation for the public sector. In fact, in many developing countries, most civil servants are members of the politically dominant group and have significant influence over the allocation of resources. Under these conditions, civil servants behave like interest groups whose primary objective is to put pressure on the political system in an effort to redistribute wealth to themselves.
Key Words: Corruption in Public Sector
CITATION: Ongera, A. N. (2020). The dynamics of corruption in the public sector: Case of Kenya Public Service. The Strategic Journal of Business & Change Management, 7 (4), 823 – 831.
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DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.61426/sjbcm.v7i4.1826
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