FACTORS AFFECTING LEGISLATIVE OVERSIGHT IN COUNTY GOVERNANCE: A CASE OF KWALE COUNTY ASSEMBLY, KENYA

JUMA MWAGUTA NZAO, PROF. MIKE IRAVO (Ph.D)

Abstract


The overall objective of this study was to evaluate the factors affecting legislative oversight in county governance: a case study of Kwale County assembly in Kenya. The study concluded that vote buying, clannism, ethnic based mobilization for electoral campaigns, elections rigging and electoral violence, dependent on political god-fathers for campaign financing, failure by citizens to link legislator oversight roles to elections and failure by citizens and political parties to consider candidates’ commitment to oversight during elections weakens legislative oversight. Equally, the study concluded that although most had adequate knowledge and skills on legislative oversight and that there existed appropriate institutional mechanisms and resources at the County assembly to support MCAs in their legislative oversight role, the lack of a sense of duty among MCAs, lack of  personal values and conviction for oversight, the absence public pressure and public support to MCAs oversight role and widespread vote buying practice in kwale weakened political will for legislative oversight. In view of these conclusions, the study recommended the following. That the County Assembly should strengthen the operations of the county assembly implementation committee to guarantee implementation of oversight recommendations. Secondly, civil society should strengthen their engagement with the county assembly and demand accountability to ensure that MCAs use their constitutional powers for furtherance of public interest and not for the personal benefit of MCAs. Thirdly, the study recommended that mechanisms be put in place so that political parties account to the public on the role they play in supporting their legislators to effectively oversight the county executive so that party cohesion is used to strengthen legislative oversight. Finally, the study recommended that the IEBC should formulate an implement electoral reforms aimed at ensuring that electoral processes are credible, free, fair and have a positive effect on oversight. This, coupled with a robust civic education program for citizens on the importance of their civic duty to collectively support MCAs in their legislative oversight role would help generate public pressure on MCAs to demand accountability from the executive hence make legislative oversight a key agenda in county governance for both MCAs and citizens.  

Key Words: Legislative Oversight, Vote Buying, Clannism, Ethnic Mobilization, Rigging, Electoral Violence


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DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.61426/sjbcm.v5i4.974

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